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Abstract
Digital certificates are one of the building blocks in delivering security en-
vironment for wireless devices. This thesis describes how certificates are ob-
tained, managed and used in the mobile environment. The main focus of the
thesis is the security technology suited for mobile phones. However, the tech-
nology introduced is not targeted only for mobile phones, since these devices
are currently in the middle of an evolution from phones to personal multi-
purpose devices. In the near future the PDA and the phone will converge into
one.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis work is to study and evaluate existing and ongoing
standards and draw a big picture over the area of certificate based security
in mobile devices. It is very easy to find comprehensive books and papers
about the information security in Internet and about the usage of certificates in
that context. But applying certificates in mobile environment is not very well
covered in scientific texts. I have been fortunate for being able to get my hands
on studies from some of the major universities and private research centres
that handle this topic. Unfortunately these studies are not public so it has not
been possible to use them as references.
In the eve of much anticipated mobile revolution, it is important to estab-
lish an open and vendor independent platform for mobile Internet services.
The standardising work for global mobile Internet has already begun. Mo-
bile device manufacturers have band together in order to specify these stan-
dards. New high speed, packet switched wireless network technologies to-
gether with more capable client devices enable more feature rich service appli-
cations: shopping, banking and new "to be invented" services.
Without proper security, mobile Internet services cannot take-off. Certifi-
cates have an essential role in the technology enabling mobile commerce. With
the help of certificates, a point-to-point security will be possible ensuring se-
cure transactions between parties.
WAP Forum specifies the infrastructure for delivering certificates over the
air connections (WPKI, WTLS [WTLS00], etc). Whereas MET [METWP01] spec-
ifies how to use certificates in practise (CUE, PTD requirements, etc.).
This thesis covers a wide area of managing digital certificates in mobile
environment. In chapter two we will go through the basic concept of infor-
mation security and cryptography. In chapter three the digital certificates are
introduced in more detail. In chapters four and five we get familiar with the
wireless world. Common characteristics of the wireless devices and couple of
important standards are introduced. Chapter six covers the major players in
the field. Chapter seven summarises the results and present some scenarios
for the future.
2 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PAIN
A PAIN model describes a conceptual framework for a theory of the infor-
mation security. The framework defines the requirements for implementing
secure applications for electronic information exchange. Tools for applying se-
curity are based on cryptographic algorithms for encryption/decryption, dig-
ital signatures and protocols for key management and data exchange.
To be able to implement inter-operative systems these algorithms must be
standardised. Two cryptographic systems exploited in the real life standards
are symmetric key and public key cryptosystems. The main difference be-
tween those two is in a way the cryptographic keys are distributed. While
in the symmetric key system a common encryption and decryption key is dis-
tributed secretly, in the public key systems the keys for these operations are
separate and does not require a secure key exchange. In fact, the private part
of the key pair of the public key cryptosystem never have to leave the origina-
tor’s domain.
Digital signature offer means for ensuring that the message is intact. By
signing the message the receiver can verify who the sender really is and the
signer cannot deny sending the message.
2.1 PAIN Model
The PAIN model in information security means that the security can be di-
vided into four categories [MEN96, 4][TAN96, 578]:
  Privacy,
  Authentication,
  Integrity and
  Non-repudiation.
Privacy (Also secrecy or confidentiality.) simply means that nobody, outside a
communicating group, is able to read the data delivered between other parties.
In electronic information exchange the privacy is usually achieved by means of
cryptography. The sender encrypts all messages into such format that without
a decryption key it is impossible to open the message.
3Authentication is needed for insuring that all parties of the communication
are the ones they are claiming to be, that the data really is originated from cer-
tain party or for controlling access to services (authorisation). Authentication
of parties can be achieved for example by traditional password mechanism or
by using other shared secret like finger print. Certificates provide somewhat
stronger shield against password guessing or similar attacks. In this case, a
certificate is like a passport that acts as a proof of identity. In case of client-
server communication, it is feasible to separate authentication of the server to
the user and authentication of the users to the server. The detailed mechanism
for entity authentication will be described later.
Sometimes the term authorisation is separated from the term authentica-
tion as one of the five elements of information security. Consider for example
a big corporate information system. All the employees may have an access to
the system, but not all will be granted rights to change the information. All
employees can authenticate to the system, but they still have different levels of
authorisation. Because the means for ensuring both authentication and autho-
risation can be implemented by certificates, I made a decision to combine both
terms into one category.
Data integrity means that there must be a way to ensure that nobody has
been able to tamper with the data received or sent by other party. To assure
data integrity, one must have the ability to detect data manipulation by unau-
thorised parties. Data manipulation includes such things as insertion, deletion,
and substitution [MEN96, 4]. Integrity can be achieved for example by digi-
tally signing the content to be sent. When the receiver verifies the signature he
can be sure that nobody has been able to alter the message. In addition to digi-
tal signature there is also other means for ensuring data integrity. For example
by calculating and verifying checksums or hash values.
Non-repudiation can be defined as an attribute of a communication, which
protects against a party to the communication denying that it occurred [WAR97,
98].When disputes arise due to an entity denying that certain actions were
taken, a means to resolve the situation is necessary. For example, one en-
tity may authorise the purchase of property by another entity and later deny
such authorisation was granted. A procedure involving a trusted third party
is needed to resolve the dispute [MEN96, 4].
42.2 Attacks Against PAIN
An attacker (adversary) is an entity that uses unauthorised means to threaten
communication. Passive and active attacks are the two main categories. A
passive attacker threatens privacy by listening and analysing for example net-
work traffic in order to be able to conceive pieces of confidential information.
An active attacker uses active means to disturb, alter, destroy or to otherwise
produce harm against authentication and integrity of information systems.
Some of the most common threads to information systems are [WAR97, 95]:
  System penetration where unauthorised person gains access to a system.
An attacker may use for example brute force technique to guess pass-
words or exploit a security weakness in the system.
  Authorisation violation where authorised person missuses the system.
For example an user account is used to gain administrator rights.
  Planting where an intruder leaves behind a planted capability to perpe-
trate future attacks. For example a piece of software that appears to be
legitimate (Trojan) leaves a back door to the system for the attacker.
  Communication monitoring (eavesdropping) that can be used for ex-
ample to listen passwords and other pieces of confidential information.
Even if the communication is encrypted a clever attacker may be able to
deduce important hints about the data merely by for example collecting
statistical information.
  Communication tampering where an attacker modifies or disturbs com-
munication for example by changing data records. Sometimes an at-
tacker may cheats others by claiming to be some other legitimate party
of communication and persuading hand over confidential information.
  Denial of Service where an attacker for example floods a server system
with bogus requests so that not even authorised users can get service.
  Repudiation where a party of communication denies that the communi-
cation ever occurred.
52.3 Cryptographic Algorithms
A cryptosystem defines a pair of data transformations called encryption and
decryption. Encryption is a process, which is applied to data, known as plain-
text. Encryption transforms the plaintext data into ciphertext. The result of ap-
plying decryption transformation to the ciphertext is again plaintext [WAR97,
101].
The transformation process for encryption and decryption needs a key,
which defines the result. Usually the algorithm remains the same independent
from the session. Only the key changes between sessions.
Cryptographic algorithms can be divided into two main categories: sym-
metric key algorithms and public key algorithms. With symmetric key algo-
rithms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. For the public
key algorithms, two keys are needed. The cryptoalgorithms themselves are not
very interesting in this study’s point of view since the techniques used later are
relatively independent from the algorithms. For comprehensive introduction
of cryptography refer for example to [MEN96].
2.3.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In symmetric key algorithms, the same key is used for encryption and decryp-
tion has to be shared with two communication parties. No one outside the
communicating parties can gain access to the key. The symmetric key encryp-
tion ensures the confidentiality and the authentication of information. The
confidentiality, of course, is originated from the encryption of data. The au-
thentication is caused by the fact that only trusted parties have knowledge of
the secret key.
A symmetric cryptosystem operates well as either a block ciphering or a
stream ciphering. In a block cipher, the encryption functions operate on a
fixed-size block of plaintext and generate a fixed-size block of ciphertext with
the same length. The decryption function operates to the opposite direction
resulting plaintext from fixed-size ciphertext block. Stream cipher can operate
over a plaintext message or stream of data of arbitrary size, generating cipher-
text of the same size; a stream cipher typically processes the data as a sequence
of characters, where a character can be considered to be one bit or a small
number of bits [MEN96, 103].
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Figure 2.1 Public key used for encryption.
The most commonly used and known symmetric key cryptographic algo-
rithm is called DES. DES is a symmetric key cipher, which operates on 64-bit
blocks of data and employs a 56-bit key [WAR97, 103]. Because of the rela-
tively short key length various extending algorithms have been developed to
meet today’s challenges set by the ever-increasing processing power. Consult
for example [MEN96] for more information about DES and its variations, or
other algorithms like IDEA and Blowfish.
2.3.2 Public Key Cryptography
As opposed to symmetric key algorithms, the public key algorithms use two
keys: one for encryption and another for decryption. The keys are called pri-
vate and public, respectively. Only the owner of the key pair knows the private
key. That is why it is sometimes called a secret key. Inherited from the algo-
rithm used for generating the key pair, there is no way to deduce the private
key from the public key. Hence, the public key can be delivered to anyone
interested across an unsecured medium, for example Internet.
The public key cryptography can be used in two modes of operation. With
the first mode, the public key is used for encryption. A receiver, that is, the
owner of the private key can decrypt the message with its private key. No-
body else is able to decrypt the message, but anyone who holds the public
key can use it for encryption. Consider Figure 2.1 where N receives a message
encrypted by A. Even when both A and B have access to N’s public key B is
not able to encrypt the message sent by A. Privacy is guaranteed in this case.
However, there is no guarantees for integrity or authentication. The message
could have been sent by anyone having an access to N’s public key. N cannot
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say for sure who was the originator of the message and that the contents is
intact.
In the second mode the private key is used for encryption and public key
for decryption. Consider Figure 2.2 where N sends an encrypted message to A
who is can read the it after decryption using N’s public key.
By using the private key as an encryption key, public key cryptography
can be used for data origin authentication and for ensuring the integrity of
the message [MEN96, 109]. Some public key cryptosystems provide only au-
thentication mode, but not the encryption mode. These are called irreversible
public key cryptosystems. Systems that provide both authentication and data
integrity are called reversible public key cryptosystems.
2.3.3 Digital signatures
The digital signature provides means for ensuring integrity and non-repudiation
of electronic messages. A digital signature is a number dependent on some se-
cret known only to the signer, and, additionally, on the content of the message
being signed. If the message is changed the signature calculated again would
not be the same as the original. In theory it may be possible form two messages
that produce the same signature but it is highly improbable that the other mes-
sage makes any sense to the receiving party.
Signature must be verifiable: if a dispute arises as to whether a party signed
a document, an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter eq-
uitably, without requiring access to the signer’s secret private key [MEN96,
425]. In public key systems the signature can be verified by using the public
key corresponding to the secret key that was used to sign the message. Power-
8MessageA
Plaintext
Plaintext SignatureSign Verify Signature
B
OK?
A A
Figure 2.3 Digital signatures
ful digital signature capabilities, which do not require that the verification key
be kept in secret from the recipient, can be built using public key technology
[WAR97, 112].
Figure 2.3 illustrates the overall process of signing and verifying a message.
The originator A signs the plaintext with his private key and attaches the sig-
nature into the message. The recipient B then verifies the message with the
public key of A.
RSA Digital Signature
In one of the standard digital signature mechanisms used, RSA, the encrypted
version of the message is sent attached to a copy of the plaintext message.
The verifier must decrypt the signature with the originators public key. If the
plaintext and the decrypted signature are the same, the message is intact and
originated from the sender. Figure 2.3 illustrates the process of the simplified
RSA digital signature scheme.
The above method of signing messages has one big problem. The signature
doubles the size of the message. With long messages, the signature is obvi-
ously a waste of recourses. The answer for the problem is to use a encrypted
hash value (digest) as a signature [WAR97, 114]. The hash value is calculated
from the plain text messages using a hash function, for example DSA, MD5 or
SHA-1. This digest is always fixed length and usually much shorter than the
message itself. Typically digests are from 56 to 128 bytes long. The digest is
the encrypted with the senders private key and attached as a signature with
the plain text message. The receiver can be sure that the message is intact if the
decrypted signature and a digest the receiver calculated from the message are
the same.
92.4 Key Management
Key management includes ensuring that key values generated have the neces-
sary properties, making keys known in advance to the particular systems that
need them, and ensuring that keys are protected as necessary against disclo-
sure and/or substitution [WAR97, 117].
When the literature deals with key management issues at least the follow-
ing operations are usually covered:
Generation Generation of a key involves an algorithm and satisfactory ran-
dom data. The key’s tolerance against attackers depends on the quality
of the key generation operation. None of the key generation algorithms
has been proved unbreakable, but choosing a publicly known strong al-
gorithm ensures a satisfactory security for several years.
Registration Registration involves linking a generated key with its particular
use.
Distribution There is a fundamental difference on distributing the keys de-
pending on whether the cryptosystem used is based on symmetric key
or public key technique. In symmetric key cryptosystems the secret must
be set in danger when the key is distributed to other parties. In the pub-
lic key cryptosystems no secret data have to be shared with other parties.
The difference between the two methods are described in chapter 2.4.1.
Replacement Normally the lifetime of a key is limited and after the validity
period the key must be replaced with a new key.
Revocation Key revocation may be necessary in exceptional circumstances.
Reasons for key revocation include the decommissioning of a system
with which a key was associated, suspicion that a particular key may
have been compromised, or changes in the purpose for which the key
was used [WAR97, 119].
In addition to the operations above, the literature often handles issues like
registration of keys, backup/recovery, key escrow and termination.
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2.4.1 Distribution
Symmetric Key Systems
Because the same key is used for both encryption and decryption in symmet-
ric key cryptography, the consequence is that the key has to be delivered se-
cretly to all parties to communication. If the aim is to be able to communicate
with several groups having different keys the key distribution and manage-
ment can become a burden. If the communication consists of n parties, the
overall number of keys in the system is 

. Figure 2.4 shows (a) almost all so-
lutions proposed incorporate a Trusted Third Party (TTP), who is responsible
for maintaining a repository of keys.
In Figure 2.4 (b) A wants to send a message to B. First, A obtains the secret
key of B from the TTP using TTP’s secret key, which has been delivered to all
parties beforehand. A sends the message to B. The overall number of keys is
	 . Hence, the workload of managing keys is reduced significantly.
Public Key Systems
In public key systems only the public part of the key-pair have to be delivered
to other parties. The private key is always kept in hand of the owner and can
be stored into a safe place, such as a smart card. On the other hand, delivery
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of the public key does not require being secured, because there is no way of
misusing it. Public keys can even be distributed through a public server like
one of those dozens set up for PGP keys in Internet.
Means of public key delivery is not limited to just using TTP. The following
five different public key distribution models are introduced [MEN96, 555]:
1. Point-to-point delivery over trusted channel. For example delivery phys-
ically from hand to hand. This kind of delivery is suitable if a high level
security is required since the authentication and integrity can be guaran-
teed personally.
2. Direct access to a trusted public file. An example of this kind of delivery
could be a LDAP directory specified in [RFC 2559] where the keys are
stored and the clients can make direct requests for keys. Authentication
and integrity of the keys can be achieved by for example certification
chain described in 3.1.
3. Use of an on-line trusted server. This method allows a similar access to
the public keys as the previous method but the requests are not directed
to the files it self. Instead, the requests may consists of a name for the sub-
ject or some other attribute. The server processes the requests according
to its internal rules and responds with a key information..
4. Use of an off-line server and certificates. In this method the TTP plays
more active role that in previous two. In this case the TTP is often called
Certification Authority (CA) who’s role is explained in Chapter 3. An
example for this kind method is described in 5.5.2.
5. Use of systems implicitly guaranteeing authentication of public parame-
ters. In some systems the authentication of the users is implemented by
using for example electronic identity cards or finger prints. In this kind
of systems the public keys can be expected to be authenticated already as
a service of the system.
Even if the confidentiality when distributing the public key is not required,
the authentication is. Otherwise, a risk of an impostor falsely claiming to be
someone else increases. In open networks, like Internet, the authentication
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(and also integrity) of public key is often maintained using certificates, which
are essentially public keys that are digitally signed by a trusted third party.
Certificates are covered in more detail in Chapter 3.
3 DIGITAL CERTIFICATES
A digital certificate is an electronic counterpart for passport. It is an assurance
of an identity of the subject and issued by a trusted third party. Oversimpli-
fying, in public key infrastructures, certificates consist of the subject’s public
key and a digital signature of a trusted third party, who is responsible for rea-
sonably strict checking of the subject’s real identity. This TTP is often called
Certification Authority, CA. A reliable signature assures the integrity of the
certificate.
For verification of the signature included in the certificate a public key of
the CA is needed. Fortunately, the CA’s public key can be delivered also in a
certificate. The only problem is that how to make sure we have an untouched
CA certificate. The answer to the problem is a special kind of certificate called
root certificate. Root certificates are guaranteed to be trusted and usually they
must be distributed via off-line route. For example, in WWW browsers, root
certificates are included already in the software package and the user cannot
alter them.
In addition to further introduced X.509 and WTLS certificates there are
other commonly used certificate types as well. For example, PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy) certificates, which are well suited for messaging applications like email.
However these certificate types are not used to offer seamless, protocol level
security. PGP certificates are distributed from a friend to another or collecting
certificates into public on-line repositories forming networks of trusted parties.
The “Net of Trust” formed by PGP communities cannot really offer a common
framework for generic security services because the PGP is too specialised in
one application, email. The same applies to other certificate based systems as
well. They are too specialised, proprietary or otherwise not widely used. That
is why they are not interesting in the context of this work.
3.1 Certificate Chain
The recursive paradigm of obtaining and verifying certificates leads us to a
general model, called the certificate chain. Figure 3.1 illustrates the situation.
The topmost certificate, the root CA certificate, must be self-signed. Under the
root certificates there are other CA certificates that are signed by the root. The
user certificates are at the end of the branches. The verification hierarchy under
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one root CA certification system is called certification tree. Several certification
trees can be cross certified by other root CAs so that they form a forest of hi-
erarchies. In real life there might be number of cross certified root CA’s used
even inside of one organisation. In commercial products there can be dozens
of root certificates preinstalled from different commercial certification author-
ities. These root certificates are usually not the ones from the top of the tree,
but some certificates under the root.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simplified representation of an ideal case where there
is only one trusted root CA certificate in the system and the direction of the cer-
tification always goes from top to bottom. If the subject of certificate A needs
to verify that the certificate C’s public key can be trusted, the verification path
will go through six nodes. It is mandatory that A have access to all certificates
along the path.
In addition to root CA certificates also non-root CA certificates can be cross
certified as illustrated in Figure 3.1 where CA certificate “Local CA 1.2” is cross
certified by “Sub CA 3”. If the B’s subject needs to verify C’s public key the cer-
tification path without the “shortcut” would have to go through seven nodes
but with the cross certification only five nodes are involved.
From the software point of view, verifying any arbitrary certificate using
the chain looks easy. However, in reality, it is the most difficult part of the
whole security system based on certificates. Obtaining and verifying missing
nodes between the root and the leafs is not a trivial task, as will be proved later
in Section 5.2.6.
3.2 Employment of Certificates
Certificates, public key certificates especially, provide a fundamental building
block for secured electronic communication. Underlying cryptographic algo-
rithms can easily be changed to meet respective needs of parties. The encryp-
tion algorithm or the digest algorithm used in any particular certification type
is not fixed and often the certificate itself can contain information of the used
algorithms.
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Figure 3.1 Certificate Chain
3.2.1 Encryption
In theory, one can use a public key included in a certificate to encrypt mes-
sages, but in practise, public key encryption algorithms are too slow for this
purpose. Thus, often the public key in certificates are used only for establish-
ing a onetime session key, which is then used for encryption of messages. The
session key must be suitable for symmetric ciphering algorithm that provides
better performance. This kind of method is called Hybrid Key Transport Pro-
tocol or Digital Envelope.
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Diffie-Hellman (DH) [RFC 2875] is maybe the most famous key agreement pro-
tocol for establishing a shared secret key between two parties. DH be used to
generate a session key when establishing an encrypted channel between two
communicating parties. The basic version of DH key agreement protocol is
presented as follows [MEN96, 516]:


and  each send the other one message over an open channel. Shared
secret  known to both parties


and  . An appropriate prime  and generator
of  ﬀ ﬂﬁ are selected and published. Protocol messages:
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Diffie-Hellman key agreement has been criticised as being vulnerable to “Man-
in-the-middle” attack where an attacker acts between parties so that
ﬃ
and
!
both believe being in direct contact with each other but in reality the attacker
is able to eavesdrop the communication.
3.2.2 Entity Authentication
Public key certificates are widely used for authenticating parties to commu-
nication. Authentication based on public key cryptography has an advantage
over many other authentication schemes because no secret information has
to be shared by the entities involved in the exchange. There are two main
categories of the public key authentication; digital signature based and non-
signature based [MEN96, 507].
One method of certificate based authentication is based on usage of dig-
ital signature combined with a public key certificate. I this method a user
(claimant) attempting to authenticate itself must use a private key to digitally
sign a random number challenge issued by the verifying entity. This random
number is a time variant parameter, which is unique to the authentication ex-
change. If the verifier can successfully verify the signed response using the
claimant’s using the claimant’s public key, then the claimant has been success-
fully authenticated [USG97].
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Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
Needham-Schoeroeder public key protocol represents one of the key establish-
ing protocol suited for authentication of peers that have access to each others
public key certificates. The protocol is described as follows [MEN96, 508]:
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using an appropriate publicly known non-reversible function U .
3.2.3 Authorisation
Public key certificates bind a public key and an identity, and include additional
data fields necessary to clarify this binding, but are not intended for certifying
additional information. Sometimes additional information for authorisation
is needed to be included into certificates directly. These kinds of certificates
18
are called attribute certificates. Attribute certificates are similar to public key
certificates but specifically intended to allow specification of information (at-
tributes) other than public keys, such that it may also be conveyed in a trusted
manner.
Attribute certificates provide a way to represent authorisation. For exam-
ple a system administrator grants user a certificate that allows him to access
specific database information but does not allow him to make modifications to
this database. Traditionally, the authorisation is handled by maintaining access
rights in the system where the users are required to authenticate themselves.
When the user logs into the system his access rights are updated according to
the access list. These access right lists may be a burden for the system admin-
istrators. In attribute certificates the authorisation is carried in the certificate
itself.
Every system has at least implicitly defined policy dictating what is al-
lowed and to whom. These policies can be collected together and grant users
attribute certificates that for example define their level of rights to the system.
This level of rights (authorisation) may consist of, for example, the following
levels: basic, exclusive and administrator. For database systems these levels
could mean, respectively, read only access for certain tables, access to addi-
tional tables and full control. When a basic level user needs access to exclu-
sive level tables, the old certificate is discarded and a new with updated level
granted.
3.2.4 Data Integrity
Data integrity is guaranteed by calculating check sums or hash values from the
original data. By checking the calculated value against the sender’s announced
value the receiver can be sure that the data is not modified. If the plaintext
is combined with a secret key common to both parties, the originator of the
message can be positively identified. The secret key can be delivered by means
of encryption and authentication introduced above.
3.2.5 Non-repudiation
In cryptography, the term non-repudiation means a service for providing a
proof of data integrity and origin so that non of the parties of communica-
tion can deny it occurred [WAR97, 315]. In other words, neither parties of the
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communication can repudiate being in contact with each other, nor can they
falsify the data sent during communication. The system has to support third
party verification at any given time during or after data exchange. It is then
necessary to collect evidences during the communication for later verification.
Evidences include information about the parties, their authorisation and the
data that is exchanged.
There is, however, no need to disclose the data itself to third party. That
would not be in line with communication security. Third parties must be
trusted, but not to such extent that the secret information should be disclosed
to them. To collect evidences meta-data of the communication is enough; sig-
natures, timestamps and other pieces of information. For comprehensive in-
troduction to non-repudiation services see [WAR97, Chapter 8].
3.2.6 Secure Transactions
Secure transaction is actually a combination of all the parameters in character-
istics above. Certificates are considered as a key part of securing transactions.
There are implementations of seamless security protocol build into user level
applications. Probably the most famous of them is SSL (Secure Socket Layer)
developed by Netscape Corporation [NET98]. WTLS protocol for wireless de-
vices is introduced in Chapter 5.2.
3.3 Certificate Life Cycle Issues
Many standards for managing and delivering certificates have been proposed.
The most common of them, X.509 PKI, was originally presented by RSA. Later
the standard was adopted and developed by ITU.
3.3.1 Certificate Issuance
Before a certification authority can issue a certificate for a subscriber, the sub-
scriber needs to register the certification authority, typically by completing and
submitting a certificate application. Registration involves the establishment of
a relationship between the subscriber and CA, and the lodging of certain sub-
scriber information with the CA [WAR97, 207]. When the CA is assured of the
identity of the applicant, the certificate can be generated and delivered to the
subject.
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Figure 3.2 Digital Certificates
3.3.2 Certificate Update
Normally certificates have a limited validity time, which can vary from few
years to few minutes. After the expiration time the certificate must be updated.
The way in which this is accomplished depends upon practises of the CA. In
case of compromised key, either CA’s or subjects, the certification must also be
updated.
3.3.3 Revocation
At the time of a suspected key compromise or other reasons during the va-
lidity period of a certificate the CA by itself can issue a revocation or another
authorised party can request revocation from CA. CAs frequently publishes
certificate revocation lists (CRL), from which the certificate verifier can check
if the certificate is revoked.
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3.4 Public Key Certificate types
The most widely recognised standard public key certificate format for commu-
nication protocol level security is that defined in the X.509 standard [MEN96,
214]. Another certificate format, WTLS certificate, is based on X.509 but de-
signed for wireless communication. In this section those two certificate for-
mats are introduced. There are also plenty of other certificate types, but they
are not really used in wireless devices.
3.4.1 X.509 Certificate
X.509 is de facto standard format for the certificates in Internet. In Figure 3.2
on the preceding page a simplified X.509 public key certificate is illustrated.
The X.509 certificate consists of the fields shown in Figure 3.2 (a).
Version field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When exten-
sions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3 (value is 2). If no
extensions are present, but a Unique Identifier is present, use version 2 (value
is 1). If only basic fields are present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from
the certificate as the default value) [RFC 2459].
The entity that created the certificate is responsible for assigning it a serial
number to distinguish it from other certificates it issues. This information is
used in numerous ways, for example, when a certificate is revoked its serial
number is placed in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
Signature Algorithm ID identifies the algorithm used by the CA to sign
the certificate.
Issuer Name follows the X.500 format name of the entity that signed the
certificate. This is normally a CA. Using this certificate implies trusting the
entity that signed this certificate. (Note that in some cases, such as root or
top-level CA certificates, the issuer signs its own certificate.)
Each certificate is valid only for a limited amount of time. This Validity Pe-
riod (Valid Not Before, Valid Not After) is described by a start date and time
and an end date and time, and can be as short as a few seconds or almost as
long as a century. The validity period chosen depends on a number of fac-
tors, such as the strength of the private key used to sign the certificate or the
amount one is willing to pay for a certificate. This is the expected period that
entities can rely on the public value, if the associated private key has not been
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compromised.
Subject Name is a name of the entity whose public key the certificate iden-
tifies. This name uses the X.500 standard, so it is intended to be unique across
Internet. This is the Distinguished Name (DN) of the entity, for example,
CN=Vesa Hametvaara, OU=MSW, O=Nokia, C=FI (These refer to the subject’s
Common Name, Organisational Unit, Organisation, and Country.)
Subject Public Key Information is the public key of the entity being named,
together with an algorithm identifier which specifies which public key cryp-
tosystem this key belongs to and any associated key parameters.
Fields Issuer unique identifier and Subject unique identifier may only
appear if the version is 2 or 3. The subject and issuer unique identifiers are
present in the certificate to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or
issuer names over time. [RFC 2459]
X5.09 certificates in real life usually contain some Extensions that are only
additions in version 3. Some of the extensions are proprietary serving some
specific function. Standard extensions are listed in [RFC 2459].
Signature of the above fields using the algorithm identified in Signature
Algorithm ID field.
3.4.2 WTLS Certificate
The WTLS certificate is specified in [WTLS00] by WAP Forum. Compared to
X.509 it is smaller and, thus, optimised for wireless communication. The WTLS
certificate consists of the fields shown in Figure 3.2 on page 20 (b) [WTLS00].
Version of the certificate for the current specification is always 1.
Signature Algorithm used to sign the certificate may be any of the sup-
ported in WTLS specification.
Issuer of the certificate defines who signed the certificate. Certificates are
usually signed by Certification Authorities.
Validity Period (Valid Not Before and Valid Not After) defines the begin-
ning and the end of the validity period of the certificate, expressed in standard
UNIX 32-bit format (seconds since the midnight starting JAN 1, 1970).
Subject is the owner of the key, associated with the public key being certi-
fied.
Public_Key_Information consists of Public key type that is the algorithm
of the public key and Parameter Specified that define parameter relevant to
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the public key.
Signature of the above fields using the algorithm identified in Signature
Algorithm ID field.
4 CERTIFICATES IN THE WIRELESS ENVIRONMENT
The wireless communication introduces a number of interesting new chal-
lenges for certificate handling compared to wired communication. First, wire-
less network protocols vary greatly in the way they handle security issues. In
Internet world we have already used to exercise well-established public key
security protocols and applications like SSL/TLS and PGP. But in the wire-
less world, the development has been going on only for few years. Second,
the network itself sets some challenges. Wireless network is often slow and
unreliable, and always subject to eavesdropping because of its broadcasting
characteristic. Third issue is mobile devices. Their low computational power
should be considered, which means a security protocol requiring heavy com-
putation is not adequate [CHA97, 1]. Also limited memory and user interface
set requirements for security implementation.
4.1 The Network Infrastructure
Unlike in Internet world, the wireless networks are not based on any glob-
ally accepted universal standard, that is, Internet Protocol (IP). Currently there
are many competing network standards in the world. The way they handle
security varies significantly. The only things that are common to all wireless
networks is that they are inherently slow, unreliable and the physical medium
is always broadcasting type.
Wireless networks can be divided into three main categories:
  Public Land Mobile Networks (PLMN)
  Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)
  Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN).
The first category comprises of well-known standards like GSM or CDMA and
their packet based enhancements GPRS and CDMA2000. The security level of
these mobile networks varies from almost non-existence to relatively secure
communication. For example in GSM networks the user authentication and
the data security is remarkably high compared to older analogical networks
like NMT. Although somewhat secure, these protocols are not by themselves
secure enough for ensuring security in the application level.
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The WLAN family consists of such protocols where the network coverage
is not as extensive as with PLMN. These protocols correspond to the local area
network (LAN) in the wired world. The most well known standard for WLAN
is IEEE 802.11. The security in IEEE 802.11 is at least very questionable. A
group of researchers was able to crack the encrypted passwords used in the
protocol within few hours [WEP01]. Fortunately, some well established secu-
rity protocols known in the IP networks can be used.
Wireless personal area networks comprise of short distance networks that
are meant to be used in peer to peer like situations, for example information
synchronisation with a personal computer and a hand-held device. Two ex-
amples of this kind of protocols are IrDa and Bluetooth. IrDa, which stands
for Infrared Data Association, is a replacement for serial line communication.
The most recent WPAN standard, Bluetooth, is a short distance (<10 meters)
radio network, which is based on a small, very cheap, embeddable radio chip
that can be used for establishing a communication link between two or more
parties in very limited area within few meters.
Because of the wide variety of existing bearer technologies and communi-
cation protocols, the wireless communication needs a common security stan-
dard in order to inter-operate well. There has been some dispute whether the
network bearers in the wireless communication should be able to provide se-
curity adequate for all purposes. Researches have suggested PKI based secu-
rity mechanism for GSM [CY99]. Other studies and standards have also been
published. But the main issue remains: Considering the vast variety of wired
and wireless networks, how to both enable fully secure communication and
interoperability between all other networks?
The question has already been answered: Adapting the same or at least
fully compatible techniques as in Internet world will be the key to success.
That means that PKIX standards should be the starting point also in the wire-
less world.
4.2 Client Devices
By far the most common portable device is a mobile phone regardless of the
used protocol. The primary function of the mobile phones used to be trans-
mitting of voice. In order to transport voice via communication line only 9600
bits/sec is enough. Because of the portability, phones are usually very lim-
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ited by recourses: processing power, memory and the capability of the user
interface. The first mobile networks used analogical technique so the focus
of research was the quality of voice rather than data transfer and its applica-
tions. However, when most mobile networks changed into digital technology
feasible data applications emerged.
Another type of portable devices is PDA (Personal Data Assistant). Many
PDAs are capable of connecting to a network using a mobile phone either ex-
ternally via serial cable or infra red (two box solution) or embedded into the
device itself. PDAs usually have much more powerful processor and more
memory. Larger display and perhaps an adjusted keyboard or a stylus makes
the user experience friendlier compared to phone devices with additional PDA
functionality.
The history of above two devices is very different, but the future will prob-
ably converge. Mobile phones were meant to connect to networks but not
process any data. On the other hand, the purpose of the PDAs is to enable
processing of data away from the users desktop PC. In the market, there al-
ready exist devices that have features of both combining data processing with
networkability.
These so called third generation devices are the main concern in this thesis,
because they provide the most interesting challenges and possibilities to study.
4.2.1 Memory
Typical amount of RAM in today’s personal computer is around 128 megabytes,
which is more than enough for computing cryptographic algorithms needed
for public key systems. With enormous hard disks, the storage space will never
be a problem when storing private keys and certificates.
Typical amount of overall memory in wireless devices varies from just a few
megabytes to maximum a of 30 megabytes. Because the hard disks used in the
PCs are not suitable for portable devices, the memory type used for permanent
storage has to be very expensive flash memory. Moreover, that same scarce
space has to carry also the whole operating system and user applications. Of
course, the manufacturing technique of flash memory will advance and the
price of the flash memory will decrease. In the mean time we just have to cope
with shortage of memory recourses.
For example in current Nokia devices preinstalled certificates, cryptoalgo-
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rithms and protocol modules requires around 100 kilobytes of disk space. This
does not sound like it would be any problem but one has to remember that
some other features always have to be dropped in order to include the security
features.
According to WAP Forum’s specifications, mobile entities (ME) must be
able to process certificates of size up to at least 700 bytes. MEs that support
X.509-based server authentication must be able to process server certificates of
size up to at least 1000 bytes and CA certificates of size up to at least 2000 bytes
[WCERT01, 10]. With the recent phones’ memory configuration, this should
not cause big problems.
4.2.2 Processing Capacity
Until recently, the processing power in embedded devices has been a problem
for a pleasant user experience. It has not been possible to use high performance
microprocessors in these devices because of the power consumption and heat-
ing problems. According to [FHW00], the most well known PDA, Palm Pilot,
is not a suitable device for some cryptographic primitives. The RSA 512 bit
key generation takes approximately 4 minutes on its 16MHz Motorola 68000
processor. Singing with this key takes about 7 seconds. The issues are much
worse with the 1024 bit RSA where the key generation takes 30 minutes.
Fortunately, the battery technique and processor development has enabled
the usage of more powerful processors. Some of the devices nowadays have
more processing capacity than a typical microcomputer ten years back. In the
near future, devices must be able process live video stream. So there should
not be any big problems in processing power concerning certificate handling.
However, if some of the algorithms are meant to be executed on smart
cards, as the current security specifications suggest (for example, [WIM00]),
the processing power may still be an issue, since the processor in smart cards
cannot handle heavy computations.
4.2.3 SIM Cards
Smart cards are single-chip computers that have non-volatile memory and are
able to perform a limited number of well-defined operations. User can store his
key on a smart card that usually has some physical security features. Signing
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process also takes place inside the smart card, which means that the user’s key
is never seen outside of the card [FHW00].
SIM (Subscriber Identification Module) is a special smart card used by GSM
phones to carry the owners identifying information. The user can have access
to subscribed services irrespective of a specific terminal. By inserting the SIM
card into another GSM terminal, the user is able to receive and make calls from
that terminal, and to receive other subscribed services.
SIM card would be an ideal storage for personal certificates. The operator
who delivers the SIM card to the user could generate a private key for the user
and attach a signed X.509 personal certificate. Unfortunately, this is not yet
true. More about a special type of smart card, WIM card, in chapter 5.3 on
page 40.
4.3 Mobile Services
Mobile services are usually browser-based and the user interface is tailored
for small displays. The logic is mostly in the server side running on ordinary
WWW servers. The markup language used can be plain HTML, cHTML, WAP
WML or other specialised language. From the security point of view WML
(Wireless Markup Language) specified by WAP Forum is the most advanced
because of its WIM interface.
4.3.1 Banking
In the mid 90’s, a study about the user expectations concluded that the most
useful application for mobile devices is banking [NOK98]. It is easy to predict
that banking will stay as the number one application also in the future, espe-
cially now when the great mobile boom is over without leaving any new truly
innovative service applications behind. As in the 90’s the mobile banking was
about tailored text messaging, in early 2000 it has developed into a browser
based service.
The mobile browser has one important difference when compared to the
banking services of the wired world; devices, especially mobile phones, are
closely tied to one person, which makes it feasible to involve user certificates
for authentication. The bank certainly wants to offer to its customers a secure
and relatively easy way of using banking services. Banks in general are the
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most interested party developing new security concepts. A threat of an unau-
thorised person reaching financial information is a very strong motivation.
4.3.2 Electronic Mail
According to the same study, electronic mail is the second mobile applica-
tion. People want to read their e-mails also when they are “on the move”.
To put more generalised terms the users have a need to communicate with
each other. Just like the mobile phone itself has met the needs for intimate
person-to-person communication, the mobile e-mail will meet the needs for
more formal communication.
In today’s business environment e-mail is the most important way of com-
munication. So it’s not a surprise that some high-end mobile devices come
with a native IMAP and SMTP support and some of them can use SSL when
communicating to a mail server. In that case the devices must support usage
of certificates.
4.3.3 Shopping and Auction
Another high demand application for mobiles seems to be shopping. Although,
it looks like it’ s going to stay as a high demand application only in service
providers side who want to sell people goods anywhere and anytime, with
very low costs. At least for now there is very little evidence that users re-
ally want to buy goods using their mobile devices. In the WWW world, some
goods are successfully traded electronically. For example, books, computer
hardware and such, but the mobile shopping is still non-existent.
4.3.4 Custom Niche Services
Unlike the three major applications above, some companies have developed
tailored mobile services for their own needs. For example, United Parcel Ser-
vice offers a wireless service for its customers who can check the itinerary of
their packets [UPS01]. These kinds of niche services are probably the most
useful of all.
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4.4 Mobile Software
In applications and high level communication protocols point of view it does
not matter if the underlying bearer is a GSM data call, GPRS packet radio pro-
tocol, UMTS wide band CDMA protocol or any other low level data carrier.
The only differences would be a speed of communication. Of course, faster
transfer rates allow more feature rich applications than in the past. However,
the programming API for communication does not change even if the bearer
changes. It is expected that the mobile software will be using either IP protocol
stack or compatible since that is the standard for Internet.
4.4.1 Security Protocols
SSL/TLS
SSL (Secure Socket Layer) developed by Netscape Corporation from versions
1.0 to 3.0 is widely used in Internet . Later the standard has been adopted by
IETF and is now known as TLS 1.0 (Transaction Layer Security). It is a security
layer above TCP and consists of two separate sub-protocols, namely Record
Protocol and Handshake Protocol. The SSL Record Protocol defines the basic
format for all data items sent during the session. It provides compressing of
data, generating an integrity check-value on the data, encrypting the data, and
ensuring that the data receiver can determine the correct data length. [WAR97,
169]
The SSL Handshake Protocol is used to negotiate which protection algo-
rithms will be used to authenticate the client and server to each other, to trans-
mit required public key certificates and to establish the session keys. Different
key establishment algorithms can be supported, including RSA key transport,
Diffie-Hellman key agreement and the KEA. [WAR97, 170]
WAP - WTLS
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) is a whole range of protocol specifica-
tions designed for wireless communication. The WAP counterpart for TLS is
called WTLS (WAP Transaction Layer Security). The WTLS is explained in
more detail in chapter 5.2.
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4.4.2 User Applications
One could say that there is not such thing as mobile application software.
There is only desktop software that is fitted to run on wireless hardware. Peo-
ple want to use the same applications in their mobile devices as when they sit
in front of the personal computer. It’s the quality of the fitting and the user
experience that differs from a vendor to another and from one product gener-
ation to another. When the digital convergence really happens, probably some
truly mobile applications start appearing into the market.
Browsers
The ultimate goal for all mobile browsers is to enable access to World Wide
Web, where all the services are. Some mobile browsers and standards have
succeeded better than others, but usually the user expectations are too high to
met. The Japanese I-Mode with its micro-browser is the most successful so far.
Other contenders like WAP WML and its predecessors are maybe technically
superior, but lag behind in the user experience and number of services. Some
devices, especially on PDA side, have real WWW-browsers, but the screen size
is too small for most of the today’s WWW services. Moreover, the network
speed has not been acceptable.
Certificates have been widely used with mobile browsing for few years
now. To be more precise, the usage of certificates has been enabled, but very
few people have used mobile browsing in general. Nevertheless, the technol-
ogy exists. Most WAP and mobile WWW browsers can establish secure con-
nections with servers. Enabling secure transactions in mobile browsing has
been a primary goal for many standards and organisations.
Electronic Mail
E-mail has been perhaps the most useful piece of software for mobile devices.
Usually the interface of the devices fits rather well for reading E-mail. Al-
though, compared to PC, composing messages requires much more effort be-
cause the user interface for typing is a compromise between size and usability.
Most of the E-mail applications are capable of connecting to mail servers
using SSL or TLS, hence using certificates for authentication and secure data
communication.
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Calendar and Business Card Applications
These so called PIM (Personal Information Management) applications are al-
ways included in the wireless devices. They are not interesting from the secu-
rity point of view. The interesting part is the on-line synchronisation software,
which synchronises the information from the server so that the data entered in
desktop PC will come also to mobile device. For example, SyncML, which is a
new XML based open protocol for on-line synchronising calendar events and
contacts. It is specified that SyncML uses HTTP or WSP protocols. Hence it
is possible to use secure certificate based connection when security is needed
[SMLH02, SMLW02].
Electronic Wallet
Electronic wallet can be defined as a piece of software or hardware that carry
the users certificate and credit/debit card information to be used in electronic
transactions. Information in the wallet and during transactions is protected by
cryptographic means.
People often carry their identification card and credit/debit cards in the tra-
ditional wallet. The same information can be easily presented in any electrical
form and in any device, for example in mobile phones. Some phones already
have the capability to hold wallet information but they are not yet widely used.
5 WPKI
5.1 Introduction to WPKI
As a part of the WAP security standards, WAP Forum has introduced a "Wire-
less Public Key Interface" definition fitted to the wireless environment. [WPKI01]:
The general model is adaptable to many certificate types including X.509, X.68 and
the certificate format defined in WTLS [WCERT01, 10]. The WTLS certificate has the
advantage of being very compact, easily implemented in code, and easily parsed which
may be important for initial implementations of WAP clients. In addition to the extend
possible, the WAP PKI will work interchangeably with existing X.509v3 certificates
in existing Internet applications, in order to leverage the existing Internet PKIs. Any
new format that requires major changes to the installed vase of certificate-processing
products and CA infrastructure is unlikely to be easily adopted in a short time-frame.
The WPKI specification adopts the following model [WPKI01, 12]:
  WTLS server and Root CA certificates stored in the de-
vice are WTLS certificates.
  Client certificates and CA Roots stored in servers are
X.509 certificates.
  Client certificates and CA Roots which are to be sent over
the air (OTA) and/or stored in WAP client devices will be
according to the X.509.
  Storage of the certificate URL in the device, rather that
the full client certificate, is the preferred mode, when
X.509 format certificates would otherwise be expected to
be transferred OTA.
  Storage of X.509 client certificates in the device is ex-
pected to be the exception, unless they are provisioned
on the device.
WAP Forum has tried to keep a balance between well-established interface
(PKI) and scarce resources of the mobile environment. Using X.509 certificates
in the servers will maintain the interoperability with existing content servers
and adopting URL certificates saves bandwidth for other tasks.
34
5.2 WTLS
WTLS Wireless Transaction Layer Securely is a protocol layer in WAP stack
that is responsible for establishing and maintaining a secure connection be-
tween a client and a server. It is a system level component as opposed to its
original model TLS, which is partly an application level protocol. WTLS also
enables a connection-less secure mode that TLS is lacking. There are several
classes of WTLS models. In class 2, CA public key certificates are used for
authenticating the server. In class 3, also client side public key certificates are
used.
It must be noted that even if the channel is encrypted, the data must be
decrypted in the gateway before the data is again encrypted for SSL/TSL con-
nection to the server. Even if the decrypt/encrypt operation takes place in the
memory, it can be scanned. This is why the security in WAP has been criticised.
The industry is talking about premature encryption termination. By locating
the WAP gateway to a secure place behind firewalls, the risk of eavesdropping
can be minimised.
Premature encryption termination is not the only feature in WTLS that has
raised criticisms. According to a researcher despite their close resemblance, the
WTLS protocol appears to be more vulnerable to attacks than TLS [MJSA99].
WAP Forum has specified that for WAP 2.0 the TLS protocol should be used
instead of WTLS. This is because the devices have become more capable than
before. However, it will take few years before WAP 2.0 capable devices are
commonly used. In the mean time, we have to settle for WTLS.
5.2.1 WTLS Class 1
WTLS class 1 offers an encrypted channel between the client and the server.
However, it does not incorporate certificate-based authentication. This level of
security is enough for the situations, where the information is confidential, but
the authentication of the parties is not so essential.
5.2.2 WTLS Class 2
CA public key certificates are used in WTLS class 2 for authenticating the
server. This class is suitable, for example, for credit card payment, where the
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Figure 5.2 WTLS Class 3
client wants to be sure the server is the one it is supposed to be, but the au-
thentication of the client is not so important. For the server side it is enough
that the credit card company accepts the payment, even if it’s unauthorised. If
the server needs to be sure about the client, authentication must be performed
by some other means, for example by password query.
In order to authenticate the server, the client must verify the certificate of
the server against the CA certificate. The verification is explained in 5.2.6. If
the verification succeeds, the client can be sure of the server’s identity.
5.2.3 WTLS Class 3
In class 3 the verification of the client’s certificate in server side is almost iden-
tical to the class 2, where the client verifies the server’s certificate. The only
exception is that there is probably more computing resources available in the
server side and checking the CRL is much easier. The user must have a private
key stored in the device and a corresponding user certificate, signed by a CA,
either in the device or in external repository from where the server can retrieve
it.
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5.2.4 End-to-End Security
Application level end-to-end security can be achieved with a SignText oper-
ation specified in WAP 1.2 [WSCL00]. This function takes a string input and
outputs a signed string. The server can challenge the client by calling the func-
tion in a WAP page. The client signs the plain text challenge with its private
key and sends it to back to the server, which should then be able to verify the
signature with the client’s public key. The SignText operation must be pro-
tected with a PIN query, so that unauthorised person cannot pretend to be the
client.
WAP 1.2 and 2.0 specifications introduce a system level end-to-end security
model, where the default WAP gateway re-directs the client to another gate-
way, which is located in the same security zone as the content server [WETE01].
5.2.5 WTLS Authentication
In Figure 5.3 the full WTLS handshake procedure is illustrated as a sequence
diagram. (1.) The handshaking is initiated by the client by sending a Client
Hello packet to the server. (2.) The server responses with its public key cer-
tificate and other session parameters. For example, the used cipher suite and
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premaster key, which is used to form a master key for this particular session,
are sent along with the response from the server. In case of WTLS class 3 or
End-to-End protocol version the server requests a client certificate for authen-
ticating the client. In class 2 the client must be authenticated by other means,
usually by requesting a user name and password. (3.) The Client verifies the
server certificate and sends back its own certificate along with other session
parameters. (4.) The server verifies the client’s certificate and sends a response
to the client. (5.) Both client and server are now authenticated, the session’s
master secret is calculated and the used cipher suite agreed. The application
data pipe is open.
After the full WTLS handshake is done once the session established earlier
can be reused for as many times as the parties agree. In Figure 5.4 the previous
session parameters are stored in persistent storage in both client and server.
There is no need to send certificates or premaster secret because the session
id and the shared secret key are available to be used immediately. Although
sometimes when the security must be maximised, the full handshake can be
executed during the connection.
Sometimes the client does not have to send it’s certificate over the air, in-
stead the server can retrieve it from a certificate distribution system using de-
fined exchange protocol, for example [RFC 2510, RFC 2559, RFC 2585]. Figure
illustrates the messaging sequence between the client and the server in that
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Figure 5.5 Optimised Full WTLS Handshake [WTLS00, 50]
case. (1.) The client sends a Hello message to the server. (2.) The server knows
that for this particular client it has to retrieve the certificate from an other ser-
vice, so it does not send a certificate request to the client. (3.) Client responses
as in full handshake, but without its certificate. The data pipe for application
is now open.
Optimised full handshake can be used also when the client and the server
share a secret, which is securely provisioned into the client device. This shared
secret can be used as a premaster key.
5.2.6 Server Certificate Verification during Handshake
Client’s possibilities to verify the server certificate using long validation chain
described on page 13 are limited. Theoretically, it is possible to implement
some kind of an on-line certificate repository for mobile clients. However, ev-
ery certificate in the chains should be verified for possible CRL entry or, in the
worst case, the whole certificate may have to be fetched from a network server.
Even to determine if one certificate is on the current CRL takes a lot of effort,
as Russell describes [RUS99].
To determine if the certificate in question is in a CRL, the computer needs
to:
1. Determine the class of CRL.
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2. Determine the version.
3. Extract the individual item of the data (issuer name, signature, certificate
list, etc.).
4. Identify the validity period.
5. If expired, reject the CRL, and take security actions.
6. Identify the signature.
7. Identify the signature algorithm used.
8. Reconstruct the original unsigned CRL.
9. Calculate the corresponding hash.
10. Identify the signer.
11. Obtain the signer’s public key.
12. From the signer’s key and the signature algorithm, calculate the hash
signed by the signer.
13. If the hash is different from that of the local calculation, reject the CRL
and take security actions.
14. Search through the list of identifiers of revoked certificates, looking for a
match with the identifier of the certificate under analysis.
Although Russell does propose some faster ways to determine if the certifi-
cate is valid [RUS99], it’s because of the complexity of the chain verification,
why the industry has not yet implemented any universal chain verification
to the mobile devices. Usually the client devices have some preinstalled CA
certificates to be used for verification of the server certificates. In some de-
vices, it is even possible to install new root certificates as described in Chapter
5.4.1. Therefore, in practise there can be only two or three level trust chains, a
signer’s root certificate for and possibly one intermediate CA certificate. Some-
times the device has no signer’s certificate installed and the only way in that
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case is to ask from the user if he trusts the server certificate in question, or not.
Fortunately, the situation is not worse than in WWW world.
On-line Certification Status Protocol
It is expected that in near future the speed of the wireless communication will
allow on-line status queries. OCSP is a standard protocol that can be used
for checking the status of certificates. The protocol is described as follows
[RFC 2560]:
The On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to determine
the (revocation) state of an identified certificate. OCSP may be used to satisfy some of
the operational requirements of providing more timely revocation information than is
possible with CRLs and may also be used to obtain additional status information. An
OCSP client issues a status request to an OCSP responder and suspends acceptance
of the certificate in question until the responder provides a response.
This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between an application
checking the status of a certificate and the server providing that status.
5.3 Storing Certificates in WIM
WIM is a tamper-resistant device that can store private keys so that a key com-
promise is made impossible or at least very hard. In addition to private keys
WIM can carry other cryptographic objects and algorithm libraries. WIM uses
an object model that makes it possible to access keys, certificates, authentica-
tion objects and proprietary data objects in a simple device [WIM00, 6]. In
WPKI, WIM offers the needed cryptographic operations for WTLS. For exam-
ple, it is responsible for storing and verifying certificates.
WIM can be, and usually is, implemented on a smart card identical to SIM.
Thus, it is possible to combine those two into one SWIM card, or use two sep-
arate cards in the device. The smart cards can be protected with a PIN code
to prevent unauthorised access. For the users, the SWIM card provides a nice
way to maintain their personal security environment even after changing the
device. Just by inserting the WIM card into the new device, the user is able to
authenticate to all the familiar services as before.
From security point of view, there is no requirement of storing certificates in
a tamper resistant place. Storing certificates in WIM may be useful from point
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of view of logistics and portability. In WTLS, the server may retrieve client’s
certificate from its own sources. In addition, it is possible to store a certificate
URL instead of the certificate itself in WIM [WIM00, 15].
Although specified for WAP the certificates stored in WIM can also be used
by other applications like e-mail or WWW browser to be used with SSL. In that
case, the device has to offer an exported API to WIM operations.
5.4 Trusted CA Certificate Handling in WPKI
The WPKI definition currently supports two types of certificates used as a CA
certificates:
  WTLS certificates (Mandatory)
  X.509 certificates.
5.4.1 Delivery
WPKI introduces two primary methods for delivering of CA certificates into
a client: prepackaging and downloading. Just like in Internet world oper-
ators and manufactures, usually include some root certificates to the client.
For example, WWW-browser packages usually contain a certain set of well-
known root certificates from different Certification Authorities. In case of mo-
bile phones, the root certificates can be stored in tamper-proof read-only mem-
ory in the manufacturing phase. The user can be reasonably sure that the cer-
tificates stored are trustworthy.
Another way to install new certificates is to download them from the net-
work to the client device. In practise, downloading is initiated by following a
link in a hypertext document. In the client device there may be some precon-
figured starting page that contain links to some repositories of certificates. It is
also possible to fetch certificates via FTP or LDAP protocols.
Technically, it is possible to deliver CA certificates via WAP PUSH mes-
sages, but the WPKI specification explicitly forbids the usage of server initi-
ated delivery methods. [WPKI01, 18]. PUSH messages allow delivery of arbi-
trary content to the client devices that are enabled to listen such messages. We
cannot expect users to understand the meaning of such message. It would be
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highly probable that the user just accepts a malicious CA certificate when his
intention is to get rid of the annoying message.
The WPKI specification warns the implementers about potential dangers
of easy installation of CA certificates. "The first installed CA has the oppor-
tunity to fairly easily introduce new CAs, and users are reasonably likely not
to understand the significance of accepting a new CA using this mechanism."
[WPKI01, 23] The specification also suggests that operators should be respon-
sible for provisioning installable CA certificates, but does not represent any
suggestions for implementation. One possible solution, which should not be
over looked, is to prohibit downloading of certificates entirely. Operators are
known to be paranoid when it comes to the question of their possible liability
in court.
5.4.2 Verification
Verification of preinstalled certificates is not usually needed. The user should
be confident that the operator has already verified that these CA certificates
can be trusted. In addition, the CAs usually guard their private keys tightly.
Downloading of new self-signed certificates is of course much more compli-
cated than just prepackaging all the needed certificates into the device. For
starters, the users have to be able to find the correct URL to even reach the
certificate needed. Moreover, simply downloading and installing them could
be risky if the user is, as they typically are, ignorant about security issues. The
risk comes from the fact that the self-signed certificate is guaranteed to be in-
tact but not trusted in any way. Usually the decision of whether the certificate
is trusted or not is delegated to the user.
In order to help the user to be more capable of making the decision about
whether to trust the certificate and the signer or not, WPKI suggests two meth-
ods for the verification of these certificates. They both sound technically solid,
but some may object whether they really guarantee the trust part of verifi-
cation. But to be fair, these methods are certainly better than the ones used
with WWW browser where the verification of downloaded certificates is al-
most non-existent.
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Out of Band Hash Verification
In this method, a hash value is computed from the certificate together with a
CA information block. The certificate and the CA information are included
into a package with a special mime type: application/vnd.wap.hashed-certificate.
The precise profile of this mime type is presented in [WPKI01, 19]. The value
of the hash is delivered via some out of band channel to the client where it’s
compared to the hash value computed in the client side. Snail mail letter or an
advert in a magazine should be enough “out of band” for delivering the hash.
The method goes as follows.
  Server’s tasks:
– Form a self-signed certificate. The format may be
either WTLS or X.509.
– Compute a SHA-1 hash from the certificate.
– Distribute the certificate and CA information in de-
fined data structure.
– Deliver the hash via out of band channel, for exam-
ple printed media, web page.
  Device:
– Download the certificate from the server.
– Compute a SHA-1 hash from the certificate.
– Prompt the user to enter hashed value manually.
– Verify the hash.
– Inform the user about the decision.
The content of the mime type application/vnd.wap.hashed-certificate is
specified as follows:
struct {
CharecterSet character_set;
Opaque displayName <0^8-1>;
} CertDisplayName;
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struct {
uint8 version;
CertDisplayName displayName;
Certificate trustedCACert;
opaque cainfo_url <0^8-1>;
HansAlgorithm hash_alg;
} TBHTrustedCaInfo;
Signature Verification Method
  Server
– Compute a signature from the certificate.
– Distribute the certificate and the signature with
a mime type application/vnd.wap.signed--
certificate.
  Client
– Download the content.
– Verity both outer and inner signatures.
– Inform the user about the result.
Because the hash value is too long for the users to enter in full length, WPKI
describe a method of just entering a part of the hash without lowering a level
of security [WPKI01, 21].
In WPKI, the verification of new CA certificates is supposed to be per-
formed during the installation time. In some cases it may be feasible for users
to be able to manually initialise the verification of already installed certificates,
for example, in the situation when a person has both a used device in which
there is unknown CA certificates installed or when CA certificates are stored
into WIM or comparable removable medium.
5.4.3 Key Rollover
All certificates have a limited valid time. For this reason, there must be a way to
replace the old certificate with the new one. For trusted CA certificates rollover
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WPKI introduces a mime type application/vnd.wap.rollover-certificate. The
content of such mime type consist of a newly generated certificate signed with
the old certificate. The structure of the mime type specified as follows.
Struct {
SignedTrustedCAInfo signed_trusted_CA_information <0..2^16-1>
} RootCertificateRolloverBlock
The clients must be able to validate the new certificate. The verification
consists of the following steps:
1. Use the root public key that they currently have to verify
the signature on the trusted CA information block.
2. Perform all the checks indicated in section 5.4.2 on the
trusted CA information block
3. Accept the root certificate rollover; replace the current
root CA certificate with the new root CA certificate.
5.5 User Certificate Handling
Obtaining a public key certificate is not a trivial task for the users. First the
users should generate a key pair, save it to secure place in the device and then
he should get the public key somehow certified by a CA, which is accepted by
the service. This is why we need simple and seamless procedure for obtaining
certificates.
5.5.1 Obtaining User Certificates On-line
The WPKI specification introduces a special entity called PKI Portal. The por-
tal is responsible for providing an interface for making on-line requests. The
certification authority, for example, can provide such an interface or it can be a
completely separate entity. The specification [WPKI01, 17] illustrates one pos-
sible way to retrieve the user certificates. The following sequence is suggested:
(see Figure 5.6.)
1. The client connects to a service using standard WAP browser.
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2. The service wants the user to authenticate and re-directs the user to the
PKI Portal to obtain a user certificate.
3. The client makes a certificate request to the PKI Portal.
4. The portal acknowledges the requests and gives the client guidance on
how to retrieve the certificate. The Portal either sends the generated cer-
tificate to the client or just a reference to the certificate in on-line reposi-
tory somewhere else in the network. The portal must use some proof of
possession procedure to make sure that the user has a private key corre-
sponding to the public key.
5. The client initiates a new connection to the server and this time is able to
authenticate with the certificate.
The above scenario looks very simple way of obtaining certificates. How-
ever, it must be noted that this scenario is not the only way to obtain user cer-
tificates. This scenario seems to involve actions from the users and it is highly
unlikely that they understand what they are supposed to do and why. More
suitable scenario for obtaining user certificates is described in the following
section.
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5.5.2 Obtaining User Certificates Off-line
In Figure 5.7, the most probable scenario of obtaining user certificates is illus-
trated. The scenario does not introduce any new parties, except the registration
authority. However, from the user’s perspective, the procedure is not more
difficult than simply obtaining a SIM card from the operator or applying for a
credit card.
1. A smart card manufacturer delivers a WIM card to the registration au-
thority. In most cases, the registration authority will be a mobile oper-
ator. In the WIM card there is two private keys, one for authentication
and one for signing. Public keys and the PIN codes are delivered with
the WIM card. Nobody can alter the private keys in the card, so they are
safe.
2. After the user has made a request for the WIM card, the registration au-
thority requests the certification authority to deliver certificates for the
user and corresponding public keys in the WIM card. Sometimes the
CA can be the RA itself. This could be the case with, for example, a bank
who wants to make sure that any information of its clients will not be
disclosed, not even names.
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3. The CA either stores the certificates into the directory service or deliv-
ers them to RA. The certification of the private keys will be performed
following the policy of the CA.
4. The RA delivers the WIM card and PIN codes to the user.
5. The user connects to the service, which requires a certificate from the CA.
During the handshake, the server retrieves the client certificate from the
directory service.
5.6 Certificate Storage Management
The users have to be offered some way to manage certificates installed in the
device. In practise, this means some kind of a user interface where the user
could:
  View certificate information. According to [MCU01, 38],
at least certificate label, subject, issuer, validity period
and the fingerprint should be displayed.
  Remove unnecessary certificates. This may not be possi-
ble if some of the certificates are stored in ROM. In this
case the next feature should be implemented.
  Adjust the level of trust per certificate. A suitable set of
levels could be: “Trust always”, “Ask when connecting”
and “Never trust”.
  Manually initiate verification. The verification must, as a
minimum, check the validity period and the verification
chain. Checking against CRL should be implemented if
the device is capable of doing that.
The MET group lists the first two features above as mandatory in their spec-
ification [MCU01, 43].
6 STANDARDS AND ORGANISATIONS
As often in the computing world there are a plenty of standards to choose from.
That is the case also in the wireless world. Fortunately most of the standards
in the security business are compatible with each other and are based on well-
tested principles in Internet.
6.1 Potential PKI Portals and CAs
In many countries the government is responsible for granting identity cards
for its citizens. Also, in Finland and Sweden the government grants electronic
identity cards that can be used for digitally signing on-line transactions with
the government offices and some private service providers. Therefore the gov-
ernment could act as a nation wide certification authority. Another govern-
mental organisation suitable for offering a portal could be, for example, the
European Union.
However, the PKI Portal as suggested in the WAP specifications [WPKI01]
is not likely to be implemented globally or even nation wide. There is no such
entity that could be trusted worldwide. More likely, different interest groups
will begin forming several, probably overlapping, PKI Portals. For example,
a Finnish mobile operator Radiolinja has recently announced that it will start
working as a certification authority for its subscribers and offer WPKI func-
tionality. Several service providers, insurance companies, a major bank and a
big retail chain have made an agreement with Radiolinja that they will accept
Radiolinja’s signed certificates for transactions. [RAL02] One must not be an
expert to see that the operators in general are the most suitable for the job.
6.2 Standardising Organisations
There are many organisations that are interested in developing a world-class
standard for secure mobile transactions. Most of them are co-founded by big
corporates and the main goal is to make sure that the infrastructure allow peo-
ple to consume their money anywhere, anytime and with ease. In other words,
the goal is to establish a common business environment for device manufac-
tures, operators and service providers.
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6.2.1 WAP Forum
WAP Forum develops specifications for enabling wireless services in mobile
terminals. The standards are available for downloading by anyone. “Wire-
less Transaction Layer Secure” and “WAP Identity Module” among with other
security related specifications are widely considered as reference material for
implementers of secure services. WAP Forum has adopted the same technol-
ogy as in Internet and fitted it to wireless world.
6.2.2 SET
One of the early pioneers in Internet secure transactions area is SET organi-
sation (Secure Electronic Transaction), which defines itself as follows: SET is
an open technical standard for the commerce industry developed by Visa and Master-
Card as a way to facilitate secure payment card transactions over Internet. Digital
Certificates create a trust chain throughout the transaction, verifying cardholder and
merchant validity, a process unparalleled by other Internet security solutions.
The SET has never been a big success in the PC world, because the users
need to buy a relatively expensive piece of equipment, the smart card reader.
Otherwise SET could have become a widely spread standard. SET is one po-
tential registration/certification authority for WPKI.
6.2.3 MET
As the WAP Forum has specified the standards from the implementers overview,
MET (Mobile Electronic Transaction) has taken an other perspective for secure
transactions, the user experience. MET embraces current WAP standards in-
cluding WTLS and WIM. The driving force for MET specifications is a predic-
tions that wireless devices will transform into something they call as Personal
Trusted Device (PTD). The MET specifications describe common usage scenar-
ios for WAP shopping, banking and other commonly known applications in
user’s perspective.
6.2.4 MOBEY
Mobey Forum also embraces WAP architecture, like MET, but also incorpo-
rates the same kind of technology as SET. From their technical specification
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[MTE01]: The objective of the Mobey Forum is to enhance the use of mobile technol-
ogy in the financial services market, including banking, payments and brokerage. The
methods of Mobey to achieve this are by creating business and technical requirements,
evaluating potential business models and technical solutions, and then making recom-
mendations to standardisation bodies, handset manufacturers, payment schemes and
technology suppliers to implement the required solutions.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE
WPKI provides a public key infrastructure for mobile devices and brings the
the X.509 certificates used in Internet to the mobile users. Together they ba-
sically allow using the same certificate based services in mixed environment
where the underlying network bearer and device can change from wired PC
to mobile phone. The private key needed for transactions can be carried in a
tamper resistant smart card, WIM card. WIM specification could be SET done
right if the manufacturers can bring enough applications and devices with rea-
sonable prises to the market.
On of the most questionable security features on WAP is the fact that in
WTLS connections the WAP gateway decrypts the communication between
the client and the gateway in order to be able to encrypt it for TLS connection
established between the gateway and the content server. I would not person-
ally trust national secrets over the current WAP protocol. Fortunately in the
future specifications the WAP gateway will be left in history and a pure TLS
protocol will be utilised also in mobile services.
As the capacity of the mobile networks and the processing power of the
client devices evolve, all the bottle necks from the security point of view will
be fixed. There will be no excuses not to incorporate strong authentication
and privacy methods for wireless services. However, the political issues, like
who can you trust as a CA, will not be solved purely by technical progress.
The author’s prediction is that the mobile operators will take a leading role in
building of WPKI portals. Some of this is already in sight, since the first pilot
projects have been gone through and the final announcement for starting real
life services have been made.
One thing that bothers when reading papers and specifications about WPKI.
The infrastructure and theory is complicated and terms are abstract even for a
person who has been playing and developing these mobile devices for several
years. How are the manufacturers going to get the ordinary users to under-
stand what is this certificate thing all about? The specifications don’t seem to
take into account that the users do not even want to know how the security
in their devices work. What is the point of, for example, to tell the users that
they have to verify the signature of the server certificate they just downloaded
from their bank’s homepage? Fortunately, MET initiative is trying to address
at least some of these questions. The user interface requirements for the mobile
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security could be a title for a whole new thesis.
7.1 Future
One of the key benefits that certificate-based authentication brings for ordinary
users is the possibility to get rid of the massive number of username-password
pairs we have to remember nowadays. Certificate-based authentication should
be commonly used within few years.
The most interesting new application for the future is an incorporation of
the mobile phone’s security element (WIM/SWIM) in the personal computer.
One reason mentioned for the partial failure of SET payments was the fact that
people were not willing to buy smart card readers for their home PCs. Using
the reader in the phone and connecting the two devices with Bluetooth short
distance radio enables an easy and secure way to make on-line transactions in
Internet.
7.1.1 Hybrid Payment Scenario
Let a term hybrid payment denote a mixed usage of different security ele-
ments, communication devices and protocols for executing a payment transac-
tion. Consider a scenario where a user wants to buy a book from some Internet
bookstore using his credit card information. A WIM card, which is issued by
his credit card company, is inserted into his phone. The phone itself is in a
pocket of his jacket hanging on the wall somewhere in the apartment. When
he is about to execute the transactions the PC software searches the phone for
accessing the credit card information. The user accepts the transaction with his
personal PIN code and the transaction is completed. Of course, the user could
have performed the transaction using his phone while on a train heading for
work on Monday morning. In that case he would have to use the browser in
his device and the interface would be a bit different. However, the WIM card
would still be in his phone and the PIN code would be the same that he enters
to the PC.
8 SUMMARY
In the beginning of this thesis the area of the information security in crypto-
graphic point of view was described, public key cryptography being in the
centre role of the theory. Digital certificates and how they are connected to
the public key cryptography was introduced in chapter three. Issuance, up-
date and revocation were the main issues concerning the certificate life cycle
in the wireless world. The two most used public key certificate types X.509
and WTLS was introduced as an example.
In Chapter four the wireless environment was described. The environment
consisted of the following elements: network infrastructure, client devices, ser-
vices and application software. The affect of using certificates with these key
elements was discussed. In the following chapter a WAP security, where WIM
and WTLS are the main points of the model, was introduced. Certificate is-
suance, update and revocation in WAP environment was introduced in detail,
as was also the WIM usage for storing private keys, certificates and certificate
URLs.
In chapter six most of the key organisations and the standards that they
specify were introduced, the top player being WAP Forum.
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